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Legal Education and the Legitimation 
of Racial Power
Gary Pelle r
Thank you for your invitation  to talk with you today about how the recent 
uproar about police killings of African-Americans in Ferguson, Missouri, and 
across the country might connect to your experience in elite legal education—
what might Harvard Law School have to do with what is going on? I will talk 
about the way that racial justice is ordinarily understood in law schools, and 
the shortcomings of that dominant conception.
My thesis is that Harvard Law School is one of those mainstream institutions 
of power in America that defends a universalist rule-of-law ideology as a way 
to comprehend racial justice, and a bankrupt ideology of “meritocracy” to 
justify the distribution of wealth, power, and prestige in American society.
Deans Minow of Harvard and Post of Yale recently published an op-ed in 
THE BOSTON GLOBE making explicit the connection between the events after 
Ferguson and law school’s rule-of-law mission:
The justifi cation for violence must be established through full, fair, and 
open legal procedures. If these procedures are sidestepped or avoided, 
the legitimacy of the legal system is endangered . . . . If African-American 
communities come to perceive police as alien and violent oppressors, there 
can be no hope of establishing a common and viable rule of law . . . . We 
must constantly ask how we can narrow the gaping distance between our legal 
ideals and the practices we countenance.
Now, Deans Minow and Post are each indisputably progressive—they 
have been friends to the cause for racial justice in many ways, including their 
consistent and explicit defense of the constitutionality of affi  rmative action and 
its actual practice at the institutions they head. They are allies, not adversaries. 
And their op-ed itself contains many ideas I agree with—better police training, 
accountability to citizen review boards, and regular outside review of police 
practices are all sensible suggestions. The “truth and reconciliation” process 
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they propose would be a particularly important way to begin to open up 
communication between police and the community.
But, nevertheless, I think that the liberal view of the relationship between 
law and power that they take as an ideal is misguided—in my view, the problem 
about Ferguson is not that the Black community might lose faith in the rule 
of law; the remedy for the social ills of police violence that have been so 
vividly demonstrated are not to be found in additional procedures to ensure 
racial neutrality. This way of conceiving of our situation is false, because the 
issues are substantive and political. It is not a matter of re-establishing the 
neutral norms of the rational rule of law; that universalist ideology is part 
of the problem in that it obscures the fact that power, not reason, is at stake. 
And to the extent that your law school is committed to this particular way 
of interpreting and regulating race, it helps to constitute and reproduce an 
ideology of legitimation that should be resisted, not celebrated. How is it that 
progressive white administrations of law schools committed to being perceived 
as liberal and diverse can end up defending a conservative and apologetic 
racial ideology? That’s one strand of what I want to focus on.
I also want to talk about another idea that I think is linked up with the 
ideology of  a neutral, apolitical rule of law I just described, and that is the 
parallel ideology of a neutral, apolitical meritocracy for admission to the 
hierarchy of educational institutions. I want to address the particular role 
that committed, progressive law students at elite institutions have—the particular 
responsibility of being a progressive person who wants to transform the system 
when you fi nd yourself in the belly of the beast of American legitimation. And 
I guess I could summarize my thoughts on this by a little slogan I came up 
with. I hope you like it. “The point is not to integrate the ruling class, but to abolish the 
ruling class.”  I need to work on catchiness, but that is the basic idea.
I think there is a particular responsibility and challenge that progressive 
students, particularly those from disempowered communities, face in elite 
institutions. You must maintain what W.E.B. DuBois called a “double 
consciousness.” As you learn the discourse of the ruling class, the discourse 
of the powerful, the discourse of the elite, one of the dangers is that that 
discourse will come to infi ltrate you—like the invasion of the body snatchers; 
it will kind of “podify” you; it will get inside of you and become part of you. 
You will be using these standards as the standards by which to judge yourself, 
your own value, your own worth, your family and friends. You will become an 
elitist. That’s a real danger. Not becoming an elitist means having the ability to 
disassociate yourself from the seductive rewards that are bestowed upon you 
by your admission to this elite institution. You have received some insularity 
from the deprivations that otherwise could befall you. Your ticket is punched 
to that extent; but that carries a political and existential responsibility with 
respect to those whose tickets have not been punched in American society.
So those are the two issues I want to address, and these are the frames: 
the conceptualization of the issues surrounding Ferguson as a failure of the 
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“rule of law,” and the meritocratic conception of admission to elite schools 
like Harvard.
Racial justice has been understood in dominant consciousness in America 
according to the paradigm I call “integrationism”—an ideology about race 
that has come to defi ne racial enlightenment, but one that I think is an 
impoverished and deeply conservative way to understand the issues. In 
order to put its assumptions in relief, I want to contrast integrationism with a 
diff erent paradigm: “nationalism.”
Integrationism is a mindset about race that understands “racism” as rooted 
in consciousness, in people making the mental mistake of prejudging someone 
else based on the irrational attribute of skin color. Those prejudices are then 
institutionalized in social practices—discrimination in education, employment, 
and other areas of social life—and together these practices constitute the more 
general social system of segregation. From this perspective, overcoming 
racism means achieving colorblindness about race in order to erase prejudice, 
establishing unbiased, neutral treatment in the distribution of jobs and other 
opportunities, and eventually achieving the systematic integration of social 
institutions—the opposite of segregation. The historic focus on the integration 
of public schools over all other institutions tracked this conceptualization 
of racism; since racism was rooted in ignorance, it made sense to think that 
integration of schoolchildren would eventually cure it, as children learned 
the universalist message that we are all the same regardless of race. School 
integration would ensure that a new generation of Black children would have 
an equal educational opportunity that segregated education denied. Race-
conscious school integration was understood as a necessary but temporary 
evil, necessary to compensate for past denials of equal opportunity but only 
for a short time, until equal education would render race consciousness 
unnecessary.
I believe this “integrationist” view is the dominant way that race is still 
understood in “enlightened” mainstream discourse. There is disagreement 
between liberals and conservatives about specifi cs within the framework: 
how much discrimination continues to exist; whether temporary affi  rmative 
action is still necessary to enable Black people to catch up; whether racial 
integration’s apparent failures are attributable to the conservative backlash that 
prevented full implementation, to the Supreme Court’s eventual limitation of 
the school integration remedy, or to the failure of “civil rights” to comprehend 
economic as well as legal subordination, etc. But the underlying structure for 
understanding race is shared by conservatives and liberals: racism consists of 
a mental mistake in utilizing race consciousness to interpret the world. Since, 
properly understood, race doesn’t make a diff erence, it is problematic to think 
in terms of race at all. Such prejudiced thinking is contrasted with objective, 
neutral, unbiased, rational thought at the level of consciousness, with equal, 
meritocratic treatment at the level of social practice, and with the systematic 
racial integration of social institutions. This integrationist view of race has 
been, for the most part, the virtually exclusive way racial justice has been 
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understood in the liberal and progressive white community,1 within which 
its universalist premises counter the white supremacy ideology of racists and 
segregationists.
In my view, the integrationist model serves as an apology for all the 
standards—in educational institutions or employment and job decisions—that 
were developed during a period of apartheid and continue to be used. The 
conception is that, once the “whites only” policies of exclusion are ended, 
racism has been conquered. All the other institutional practices—like using 
the LSAT as a selection criterion, for example—are taken as themselves aracial 
and neutral. That is, I think the Black nationalists of the 1960s and early 
1970s, such as Malcolm X and the Black Panthers, were right: Integrationist 
ideology allowed American culture to claim an aracial enlightenment without 
any critical examination of all the institutional practices that had been created 
during American apartheid. In legal education, that included the vast legal 
rationalization of Jim Crow segregation (and even slavery, of course) as legal, 
as consistent with the rule of law.
In the African-American community, however, the integrationist view has 
consistently been contested, not by racial supremacists, but rather by a long 
tradition of “Black nationalist” thought that denies the central, universalist 
message of liberal integrationism—that we are all the same, regardless of race—
in favor of a historicist account of the signifi cance of racial identity. Black 
nationalists dating back to the 19th century rejected integrationism on the 
ground that Black racial identity is the marker of a distinct community and 
culture, a source of positive meaning and not merely the negative byproduct 
of oppression. The core idea is that African-Americans constitute a “people,” 
a “nation,” built on generations of common experiences that establish a 
common history and spiritual connection among its members. Rather than 
understanding integrationism to mean the achievement of equality with whites 
in a neutral space of integrated American institutions, nationalists equated 
integrationism with assimilation into the culturally distinct white community, 
with its own particularistic social practices, a “painless genocide.”2 In contrast 
to purveyors of the integrationist program, Black nationalists demanded 
reparations and advocated that the Black community engage in self-help to 
build and strengthen institutions in their own independent communities.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Black nationalists developed a 
sophisticated critique of the premises of integrationism, including the 
assumption that “objectivity” and “neutrality” to race were even possible or 
desirable. Nationalists located “racism,” not in consciousness, but in external 
1. This original, pure version of liberal integrationism has been mediated by the rise of a 
limited form of multiculturalism in which diverse cultures, including African-American 
culture, are celebrated for their diff erences in quasi-public ways, while governmental power 
itself follows traditional colorblind interpretations of integrationism on the ground that it is 
the only neutral way to follow a “rule of law.”
2. Robert S. Browne, A Case for Separation, in SEPARATISM OR INTEGRATION: WHICH WAY FOR 
AMERICA: A DIOLOGUE 7-15 (R. Browne & B. Rustin eds. 1968).
409
power relations in which Blacks were subordinate to whites. Racism does 
not exist in the mind, and it’s not a mental or consciousness error. Racism 
exists out there in the world, in the maldistribution of power by race, not 
in what people are carrying around out there in their heads. Thinking about 
people in terms of race is not a sign of prejudice or stereotype; it’s a sign of 
the recognition of the particularity of communities and people of the United 
States. The evocation of an African-American community is not a vestige of 
segregation that should be abolished once we really achieve integration. From 
this nationalist view, racism’s systematic form was not segregation—shutting 
out Blacks—but colonialism, the domination relationship between separate 
nations. And the remedy was not the achievement of colorblindness or equal 
treatment or integration, but rather the redistribution of power and wealth. 
Black nationalists in the Black Power movement of the late 1960s and early 
1970s, predating contemporary postmodern critiques of claims to objectivity 
and neutrality, challenged the deep epistemological assumptions of liberal 
integrationism; they asserted a historicist, contextualized, and political 
understanding of racial power, rejecting the “colorblind” reference point 
of liberal neutrality claims. The Black Nationalist position focuses on the 
question, “What is the eff ect of this on the African-American community?” 
That, I submit, should be the key question in the current climate, not, “What 
is the eff ect on the rule of law?”
This way to understand racial justice denies the possibility of a universalist, 
neutral reason or rationality, or, say, in the Ferguson context, the impossibility 
of an objective, racially neutral defi nition of reasonableness or “probable 
cause.” Such assertions of universality are seen as illusions and fantasies of 
the Euro culture that presented itself as universal as it colonized all the other 
peoples of the world.
I want to apply these contrasting models to the questions I said I wanted 
to talk specifi cally about—the particular role of students from disempowered 
communities and progressive students at an elite law school, and the connection 
with post-Ferguson events. I want to start this out by saying that one perk 
of getting admitted here is that you can turn and question the standards of 
meritocracy that keep so many out without the accusation of “sour grapes.” So 
that’s cool, and that’s a form of power that I urge you to use. But those of us 
from disempowered communities all understand, I think, that our admission 
here, our achievement, is not because we’re so smart. We stand on the shoulders 
of our grandmothers and grandfathers and uncles and aunts and brothers and 
sisters, many of whom are not here, or not in medical school, or anywhere else 
that will grant them access to the ruling classes.
When I arrived at Harvard, I was completely freaked out and alienated. I 
thought, Oh my God, they’re going to fi gure out I’m a fraud. I can imagine 
that many people can identify with what I’m talking about. “They’ve made a 
mistake.” My wife and I pull up to Peabody Terrace, married student housing, 
and we’ve got our old rusty station wagon loaded up with all our stuff , and 
I’m embarrassed. I think (mistakenly, it turns out) that Peabody Terrace is 
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where the married prep school graduates live. They will immediately see us as 
country hillbillies. We pull up in the car and we open the door, and my wife’s 
mother had given us jars of pickled zucchini—you know, homemade Mason 
pickling jars—and we open the door and one of them rolls out and shatters 
on the pavement. I’m humiliated because, you know, I feel, looking at the 
shattered glass and vegetables, so exposed. I’d internalized a social ideology 
in which I was unworthy . . . very harmful, and a very insidious way that power 
might work.
On the fi rst day of class, I’m very nervous. The class starts, and somebody 
talks, in this deep, resonant, perfectly articulated pitch. And he talks with such 
authority and clarity. I think, well, fi rst of all, they’re all geniuses, I’m screwed. 
But tied together with that diction that I heard was the presumption of power 
and authority. (I was happy to learn—and some of you fi rst-years, I know 
are discovering this—that diction doesn’t necessarily match up with analytic 
skill. I hope that’s reassuring!) A few weeks go by, and I start hearing some 
of my classmates talk in this deep, authoritative, articulated way about this 
or that argument in some opinion of the Supreme Court, what I suspect Justice 
Rehnquist was really concerned about was . . . blah blah blah—and admitting I’m a little 
bit alienated generally, I’m thinking, ‘Who the f--- cares what you say about 
the Supreme Court, who do you think you are?” So what I’m talking about is 
a sense of entitlement and privilege that is embodied in the idea “yes, we will 
be running the world, and it really matters what we say; are you taking this down?” 
That’s what I really heard, but it wasn’t spoken: Are you taking this down? Said 
to an invisible, future subordinate of the important people these classmates 
imagined themselves soon becoming.
There were some other incidents. How many people know what jodhpurs 
are? Jodhpurs, I think—I’m about to expose my own ignorance, I was just 
hoping you all knew—jodhpurs, I think, are the very distinctive little pants 
you wear when you go horse poloing? OK, now, I’m sure this doesn’t happen 
anymore, but in my time, the self-consciousness of the ruling class was at such 
a low ebb that one of its members showed up in my Torts class in his jodhpurs! I 
know I should celebrate the diversity of such cultural expression but it pissed 
me off ! I’m telling you, I took it as a class aff ront.
Now, in this position you’re faced with a really serious self-identity question: 
Should I start talking like that? Is that what being “educated” is? And then I will 
be like them and I will be powerful and I will be an elite? Do I want to be 
entitled? Or, will that be forgetting the people I went to high school with who 
are smart enough to be here but are in jail instead (many of them)? Should you 
forget those who are cut out by the system of meritocracy—including for many 
of us our parents and grandparents and siblings and friends?
So linking integrationism, nationalism, meritocracy, law school, and the 
LSAT: The LSAT has a disproportionate racial impact. It is purported to 
predict well the performance of students in the fi rst year. Institutions continue 
to use the LSAT as the main selection criterion for legal education. Because it 
accurately measures performance in the fi rst year, that seems to be a functional, 
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neutral justifi cation: It’s not racist to use the LSAT. It has some correlation 
with fi rst-year performance. Then you start thinking, well, they’ve been using 
it for years, so the fi rst year—before there were Black people in law schools, 
the fi rst year was just a white enterprise, right? And before Brown v. Board, 
legal education in general was almost exclusively a whites-only enterprise that 
rationalized segregation as consistent with the rule of law. And this culture, of 
the fi rst-year curriculum, was, I think, developed in the 1800s—you have the 
pictures all over the hallway walls of the white guys who developed all this 
stuff —this is going way back. So what kind of consciousness could think that 
the way we teach the fi rst year and performance in the fi rst year could be any 
kind of neutral, aracial baseline to measure meritocracy—to actually measure 
something besides the way we’ve been doing this during racial subordination?
Well, then you might say, the reason we teach the fi rst year the way we 
do is that it’s got to match up with legal practice. That’s what legal practice 
demands. That’s what it takes for legal practice; you’ve got to do it this way.
And then you might say, Do you mean the same legal practice that was 
developed during racial apartheid, and that legitimated Jim Crow? And that 
developed various customs and norms about how courts should operate 
and how legal arguments should proceed? Is that what you mean by the legal 
profession that’s going to provide the baseline to tell you that your meritocracy 
is something diff erent than hidden white supremacy ideology?
The answer should be to critically examine all the institutional practices that 
were constructed during American apartheid, and not to smugly assume that 
racism was exhausted by exclusion from otherwise racially neutral institutions. 
When such an institution uses a selection criterion like the LSAT, one that has 
a clear racially disproportionate eff ect, critical scrutiny should be the greatest. 
If Harvard Law School wants to stand on the side of ending the false social 
structures associated with racial power, it should start by abolishing the LSAT. 
Abolish the LSAT! Harvard’s in a great position. Harvard doesn’t have to worry. 
There’s no excuse for this institution to use a racially biased test, because 
there’s no justifi cation for it that doesn’t depend on another baseline tainted 
by its complicity in a history of racial subordination.
Do you want to be part of this and reproduce all the norms and cloak 
yourself in the authority of the privileged? Or is it based on false premises? 
Will you be invested in the legitimacy of a “meritocracy” that selected you, 
or will you turn on this social structure of legitimation? I just gave a very 
quick analysis of the LSAT to suggest that the claim to objectivity is false: In 
a transformed law school, in a transformed legal practice, the ones who are 
successful, and the ones who are not successful, will be vastly diff erent. I hope 
that you all transform that legal practice.
When I fi rst started law school, I really thought it was going be a Socratic 
thing where you talk about justice in a very good-faith way. But that was before 
I started the classes, and so I had a quick sense of frustration. Then I realized, 
OK (this was before the boycott movement, it was a very depoliticized time), 
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what I’m going to do here is to try to learn and dissect the ideology of the 
ruling class. I want to know what they say justifi es the system that has been 
so unfair to my family and just about everybody I love. That is a very diffi  cult 
project, to try as a student to keep what you are learning at a distance and yet 
still learn it to succeed in the courses. And that project often depends on the 
presence in some of these elite institutions of some members of the elite class 
to help guide us into the confusing hallways and corridors of the mansion of 
apology and justifi cation. And so I just want to mention Duncan Kennedy as, 
in my mind, a great model of a class “traitor” who has been such a guide for 
many progressive students here at Harvard.
Turning back to Ferguson. “Black lives matter,” I want to assert, embodies 
a critique of integrationism as applied to Ferguson and recent “police 
misconduct” similar to the critique of the LSAT for admission to law school.
One way to see the Ferguson situation is as a failure of the rule of law, 
and the appropriate response is to vindicate the rule of law. The integrationist 
way implies it doesn’t matter who the police are, what color they are, or what 
communities they inhabit; they are just going to apply these neutral roles of 
reason, the same rules anyone in that position is expected to apply evenhandedly 
to “citizens”—and that makes sense if a neutral, universal rule of reason is 
possible. That’s a way to understand what happened in Ferguson. Part of the 
reason the outrage has been so widespread is that that conceptualization pulls 
in white liberals, civil libertarians, and a wide range of people who are worried 
about state power. It’s a broad coalition that you get with that analysis.
But there’s another way to understand the situation: the nationalist way.
To my mind, the context of Ferguson and policing generally in the United 
States is better described according to the colonialist analogy that was lodged 
by the Black nationalists: The mass incarceration of so many members of the 
African-American community looks as if a colonial power came in and dealt 
with the disruptive elements of the population by imprisoning them. That’s 
what the colonialists used to do. It’s worth noting that the white police offi  cers 
sent to police Black neighborhoods are themselves working-class—they’re sent 
to do the worst work of regulating and tamping down the “bad elements” of 
the African-American community. They’re sent to patrol neighborhoods that 
are alien to them, sealed up in squad cars to protect them, and they are likely 
themselves scared. It looks like a colonialized community kept in order by 
outsiders who are paid to go in and keep things quiet, but who are themselves 
just hired guns with no hope for advancement themselves.
So what should an elite law school do in this situation? Should it embrace a false 
universalist rule of law that says it doesn’t matter who you send in that community 
(as long as they put on the rationality helmet, they’re going to able to be fair and 
just to the community)—or, do you examine the colonial relationship that exists 
between the administering white world and that African-American community 
and call for it to be disrupted and transformed—to not divorce the rule of law from 
the context of racial disparate power in which the police are patrolling, but to 
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include the whole context. And when you include the whole context, the idea 
that the rule of law could be a solution is, I think, impoverished. 
So I’m returning to a thematic that I’m pulling again from the Panthers in 
the late 1960s. One way to understand Ferguson is the failure of the rule of 
law. Another way to understand Ferguson is as demonstrating the need for 
community control over institutions, such as the police. That’s what I believe. It’s 
not only the “fault” of the particular anxious white police offi  cer who pulls 
the trigger, but the system of power relations—class and race and gender and 
symbolic authority, the whole bag—in which the African-American community 
is patrolled by those who have no connection with or understanding of the 
community. The “colonialist” metaphor is not perfect, but it is a better way 
to understand what needs to be done than the false universalizing of the 
“rule of law” interpretation. More important, it depends on seeing that there 
are particular and distinct communities involved, with their own aspirations 
for self-determination and a future … an understanding that is categorically 
excluded by perceiving the issue in terms of the rule of law and probable cause 
between government and citizens.
The particular ideologies of meritocracy and the rule of law also overlap with 
respect to the selection of police offi  cers. Just as elite law schools continue to 
use the LSAT, despite its racial eff ect, the ideology of integrationism holds that 
there are neutral and objective ways to choose police offi  cers without regard 
to any of these issues of culture, power, and context. The standardized written 
tests at issue in Washington v. Davis were upheld over an equal protection challenge 
based on disparate racial impact. They were used to select police offi  cers for the 
District of Columbia. And the “objective” tests, used throughout the federal 
civil service to test “communication skills,” purported to demonstrate, on 
neutral, aracial grounds, that white police applicants were generally better able 
to communicate with the predominantly Black population of D.C. than Black 
applicants. This is, I believe, a clear window into the myopia of integrationism.
And that is, in sum, how Harvard and Yale law schools can end up defending 
the rule of law in our current racial context—the Minow/Post perspective is 
liberal and progressive, but ultimately apologetic about a range of ways that 
power is exercised, and blind to the social context of power and subordination 
in which it is all situated.
I want to urge you, as progressive students in an elite law institution, to 
resist—keep your double-consciousness; learn the consciousness of the ruling 
class and how to deploy it, but resist—don’t defi ne yourself by it. Please don’t 
adopt the “are you writing this down” sense of entitlement and authority that a 
purportedly neutral “meritocracy” says you’ve earned. Actually, please deploy 
this false authority strategically when necessary, but ultimately resist it. Resist, 
but resistance personally is not enough because things keep on going, even 
without you. So you must disrupt and then transform: Resist, disrupt and 
transform.
Thank you.
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